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A bstract
Thi s paper presents a partialequi l i bri um m odelofethni co rg e nde rpa y
di ®erenti al s,in the presence ofanti- di scrimi nati on pol i cy. P oli cy consists of
l egislati on al l ow ing workersto take l egalacti on agai nstthe di scrimi nati ng
em ployer. Iti ss ho wnt hatl egislati on on fai rr e c r ui tm enthasan unam bi gu-
ous e®ect i n reduci ng pay di ®erenti al s,w hereas legislati on agai nstunequal
pay and unf ai rdi sm issalhas an am biguouse®ectand m ay i ns o mec i rcum -
stances even produce the perverse consequence ofw ideni ng pay di ®erenti al s
i ns o me¯ r ms .
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1.Introducti on
The r ei san enorm ousappl i ed li terature attem pting to m easurethei mp a c to f r a c e
and sex di scrimi nati on i nt h el abour m arket (see C ai n (1986) for a survey),and
al so w ell - know n theoreti calw ork on the sources ofdiscrimi nati on (B ecker (1971),
Ca i n (1986)). A considerabl e body of research has also exam ined the i mp a c to fanti - di scrimi nati on l egislati on i ntroduced from the 1960s onwards i n m any coun-
tries. M ost authors have concl uded that the i ntroduction ofanti - di scrimi nati on
l egislati on caused a perm anent reducti on i np a yd i ®erenti al sbe t we e n ma l es and
f em ales and betw een m ajori t ya n dmi nori t y ethni c groups (see Freem an (1973),
C ard and K rueger(1989) fo rt h eUS A a ndZa b a l za and T zannatos (1985) forthe
UK) . T here has been som e dispute about the size ofthe pol i cy e®ect,since other
f actors such as w elf are reform ,i ncom espol i cy and changesi ni ndustri alstructure
al so occurred around the sam e time( Bu t l er and H eckm an (1977),B orooah and
Lee (1985),C hi pl i n, C urran and P arsley (1980)),but the consensus vi ew ist ha t
l egislati on was e®ecti ve.
H owever,al though the em pi ricalli terature indi c at e st hatl egislati on m ay have
raised the fem ale/m ale and bl ack/w hi te pay ratios by as m uch as 10 percentage
poi nts, ita l so dem onstrates that substanti aldi ®erenti al sr e ma i n,even af ter ac-
counting f or di ®erencesi nr e l ati ve endow m ents ofeducati on and ski l l s, and that
there has not been the steady reduction i nd i ®erenti al st hatwemi ghte xpe c tf rom
e®ective anti - di scrimi nati on pol i cy. T he reason for thi sma yl i ei n the nature of
the legislati on. In t heUSA,e x pl i cits e xd i scrimi nati on i np a yw a sma d ei l l egal
by the 1963 EqualPay A ct,and m ore broadl y de¯ned di scrimi nati on on grounds
of sex,race,colour,reli gi on ornati onalori gi nwa sma d ei l l egali n pay,prom otion,
hi ring and ¯ri ng by the 1964 C i vi lRi g h t sAc t .I nB r i tain,pol i cy developed i na
simi l ar way. T he 1970 EqualPay A ct (not i mp l em ented until1975) m ade form al
sex discrimi nati on i nc o l l ective pay bargai ns i l l egal.T h i swa sf ol l ow ed by the
1975 Sex D i scrimi nati on A ct and 1976 R ace R el ati ons A ct,w i th a broad scope
very si mi l ar to the A m erican C ivi lRi ghts A ct. T he B ritish EqualO pportuni ties
Co mmi ssion and C om m i ssion for R aci al Equal i ty, and the system of E m ploy-
me n tT r i bunal s, perform an enforcem ent functi on si mi l ar to that of the E qual
Empl oym entO pportuni t yCo mmi ssion i nt h eUS A. 1 Interestingl y,inv i ew of the
argum ents we present bel ow ,som e of the clearest evidence (Leonard 1984, 1989)
ofthe e®ecti venessofanti - di scrimi nati on pol i cy relates to the em ploym ent e®ects
duri ng the 1970sofa± rm ati ve acti on i mp l em ented by U S executive orders,w hi ch
put pressure on governm ent contractors to m eet targets for the em pl oym ent of
di sadvantaged groups (see Leonard (1985) for an i nteresting anal ysi so ft h eb e -
havi ourofthe U S governm entbody charged w i th poli cing these orders - the O ± ce
of Federal C ontract C om pli ance P rogram m es).
1Empl oym ent Tribunal swereknown asIndustri alTri bunal spr i orto A ugust1998;see Bourn
and W hi tm ore (1996)foran accountofBri tish law and its simi l ari ties w ith A m erican legislati on.
2The r ea r ec l early two phasesofpol i cy here. T he ¯rst,and simp l er,phasedeal t
wi th openlyd i scrimi natory practices that couldb ee n d e db yme a n so f as i mp l e
cour tort r i bunalorder (or by the threat ofsuch an order). T he bulko f t h e s ec l ear-
cut exam ples ofdiscrimi nati on were al m ost certainl y ended wi thinas h o r tt i meo f
the legislati on bei ng enacted,and they accountf or the sharp perm anent reduction
of pay di ®erenti al s that we observe i nt i me - series data at that time .Af ter this
¯rst phase, m ost rem aini ng di scrimi natory practices are indi rect or disguised in
som e way,and com e w i thin the scope ofthe broaderde¯ni tions ofdi scrimi nati on
used by the l ater l egislati on (and w hi ch hinge on i l l - de¯ned concepts l i ke com -
parabl ewo r t h ) .I nt h i s phase ofpol i cy,disputes rel ate m ostl yt od i scrimi natory
treatm ent w hic hma yb er e c e i ved by i ndi vi dualem pl oyees, w ithina no s t e n s i bl y
non- di scrimi natory system of m anagem ent practices adopted by theire mpl oyers.
Th usj udgem ents tend to deal m ore wi th arguabl ei ndi vi dual cases than wi th
expli cit contractual term s a®ecting l arge num bers ofworkers,and,w hen success-
f ul , they are m ore li kel yt oi nvol ve i ndi vi dualredress and com pensati on than the
simp l eb a n n i ng ofdi scrimi natory practices. From the em ployer'sp o i nt ofvi ew ,
anti - di scrimi nati on pol i cy has theref ore becom e m ore an i ssue of an addi tional
(and uncertai n) potenti al cost, than a direct constraint on possi bl ee mp l oym ent
practi ce.
I ng e n e r a l , attem pts to analyse the e®ects of anti- di scrimi nati on pol i cy have
not been backed by any theoreticalanalysi softheway thatdi ®erentf orm sofanti -
di scrimi nati on l egislati on m i ght a®ect the behaviourofem pl oyers. O ur aimi nt h i s
paper i st og i ve an anal ysi s of these e®ects. W e interpret pol i cy in the second-
phase sense described above,so thatthepri m ary consequencesto theem pl oyer of
successfulanti - di scrimi nati on acti on are vi ew ed as additionalcosts l i nked to the
i ndi vi dualcom pl ai nant, rather than di rect interventi on i n general em ploym ent
practi ce. T hese costs can be substantial . T he rate of appli cation to Industri al
Tr i bunal s (and the corresponding success rate) under the U K l egislati on have
been rather low er than int h eU S A , a n dt h ep o t e n t i al penal ties for em pl oyers
we r e a l so relati vel yl ow up to 1995, w hen the l i mi t on com pensati on am ounts
(previousl y $ 11, 000)wasrem oved.Even so,i n a 1992 survey ofcases (D epartm ent
of Em pl oym ent,1994),the m edi an total cost to an em ployer of a tribunalcase
(incl udi ng ti me ,f ees and com pensati on) am ounted to $ 1500 and $ 2300 for sex
and race di scrimi nati on cases respectivel y, com pared to only $ 49 as the m edi an
cost to an em ployee. T hese ¯gures considerabl y understate the true costs, since
they exclude the costs ofprel i mi nary i nternalgri evance procedures, the cost of
3cases that do not reach tri bunal ,a n d i ntangi bl e costs associated w i th adverse
publ i cit ya n dl ossofreputati on. M oreover,potenti alcoststo em pl oyers are rising
over tim e, as tribunal sma k ei ncreasi ng use ofhi gh com pensati on orders.
For anal yti cal purposes, w e need to identi f y three separate channel so fp o l -
i cy. O ne ise q u a lp a yp o l i cy, w hich aimst op e n a l i se any arrangem ent invol vi ng
di ®erent rates of pay for work of \com parabl e worth" suppl i e db yme mb e r so f
di ®erent gender/raci algroups. T he second and thi rd are fairr e c r u i t me n tp o l i cy
and faird i sm issalpoli cy,w hich penali s ea n ya t t e mp tt of avour particular groups
i nh i ring and ¯ri ng respectivel y. Inp r a c t i ce, these three strands of poli c yma yb e
i mp l em ented simu l taneouslywi thinas i ngl ep i ece of legislati on,but i nt e r mso f
theire c o no mi ce®ectsthey arepotenti al l yq u i te di®erent.
2.A si mp l emo d e l
Ou rmo d e li sa l mo s tt h es i mp l est possibl e. T here isas i ngl e ¯rm , operating asa
m onopsoni st int h el abour m arket,and seeki ng to m axi mi se pro¯ts. A llworkers
are assum ed i denti cal except for thei rr a c eo rg e n d e rc h a r a c t e r i stics and purely
random producti vi ty variati ons. 2 I n term s of the dem ographi c characteristics,
wor ke r sf alli nto two groups:the \advantaged" and \di sadvantaged". T he m odel
deal swi th partialequi l i bri um ,i n thesensethati nteracti onsw i th other ¯rm s and
strategicb e h a v i o u ra r en o tc o n s i dered. 3 W e are not especi al l y concerned here
wi th the sources of discrimi nati on between the two groups,and a range ofdi ®er-
ent m odelsi s avail abl ei nt h el i terature for rational i sing di scrimi natory behaviour
by em pl oyers (C ain,1986). W e al l ow fortwo possi bi l i ties,chosen m ainl yf orthei r
simp l i cit y. O ther approaches (such as B ecker's (1971) m anageri aluti l i t ymo d e l )
wi l ll ead to m ore com pl ex anal ysi sbutqual i tativel ys i mi l ar resul ts. O urconcl u-
sionsw i l lhavef orce i n any m odelwherecostsarea m aj orelem ent ofem ploym ent
and wage-setting decisions.
T he ¯rst source of discrimi natory behaviour i no u rmo d e li sap o s s i bl ed i f -
f erence inl abour suppl ye l asticities betw een the two groups. T he conventi onal
2Thi si sn o ta ni m p ortant restriction. If there are several cl asses of w orker w i th di®erent
producti vi ty characteri stic s , t h e ne a c hf orm s a separate l a bo urma k e twhi ch can be analysed i n
t h es a mewa y .
3The r ei s no obvi ous reason w hy our concl usi on shoul d be a®ected by strategici nteracti ons
between ¯rm s, and i ndeed Pudney and Shi elds (1999) establ i sh closel yr e l ated resul ts ina
di ®erentcontext,usi ng a m odelwi th Cournot- Na s ho l i gopsoni st ¯rm s.
4theory of price discrimi nati on then suggests that the group w ith the lowersuppl y
elasticit yw i l l tend to receive l ower wage o®ers i n the absence off ul l ye ® e c t i ve
anti - di scrimi nati on pol i cy. A second source of discrimi nati on i smi sperception
of average l evelso fi ndi vi dualproducti vi t yi nt h et wo groups.W e assum e that
me mb e r so fe a c hg r o u pi nf act have i denti cal levelso fp r o d u c t i vi ty on average,
b u tt h a tt h ema n a g e me n to ft h e¯ r m ma yb ep r e j udi ced, in the sense that they
bel i evethattherei s a system aticpr oduc t i vi t yd i ®erenti albetwe e nt het wogr oups .
W age di ®erences stem m ing f rom such perceptio nswoul dt e n dt ob ee l i mi nated i n
the long run (A rrow ,1972) unl ess there are either signi ¯cantadj ustm ent costs or
technologi caldi±c u l ties ini denti f yi ng the productive contributi on ofi ndi vi dual s
and thus refuti n gmi staken perceptions. T hese are both plausi bl er e a s o n sf or the
persistence of thist ype ofprej udi ce.
The¯r m i s assum ed to operate under the si mp l est possibl e¯ x e d - coe± cients
technology. O n average,each worker produces a ¯xed expected output q per pe-
riod and requi res a ¯xed set ofcom pl em entary inputs costi ng an am ount c per
peri od.Theem pl oyerispr e j udi ced in thesensethathebel i evesthe average l evels
ofproducti vi t ya r eqa n dq ¤ f or m em bers ofthe advantaged and di sadvantaged
groups respecti vel y, w here q > q¤. T here m ay be betw een-i ndi vi dualwage vari -
ati ons re°ecti ng vari ati ons i n perceived i ndi vi dualproducti vi ties,but on average
the wage rates o®ered by the ¯rm to the advantaged and di sadvantaged groups
are w and w ¤ respectivel y. Suppl i es of labour to the ¯rm are gi ven by the func-
tions s(w ) and s¤(w ¤). T he coe± cient of pay di scrimi nat i on (B ecker, 1971) i s
¸=w= w ¤ ¡1 , a n dw e a l so de¯ne a coe± cient of em ploym ent discrimi nat i on as
¹=l =l ¤ ¡ ½;where land l ¤ are the ¯rm ' sl evelso fe mp l oym ent from the two
groups and ½ i st h es i ze ratio of these two groups i nt h er e l evant part of the
wor ki ng popul ati on.
Thus ,i n the absence ofanti - di scrimi nati on pol i cy,the ¯rm bel i eves that its
opti ma l p o l i cy w ouldb et h ef ol l ow ing:
ma x¦( l ;l
¤;w ;w
¤)= l[ q¡ c¡ w] + l
¤[ q
¤ ¡c ¡w
¤]( 2 . 1)
sub ject to l 6 s(w ) and l¤ 6s ¤(w ¤). P rovid e dqa n dq ¤ are both greater than
c, and the two l abour suppl i es are strictlyp o s i tive at su± ci entlyl ow values of
wa n dw ¤,t heopt i mu m wi l li nvol ve m i xed em pl oym ent,w ith the labour suppl y
constraints hol di ng as strict equali tie s .Theo pt i m um can then be represented as
the fol l ow in gma x i mi sation probl em :
ma x
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whe r e²a nd² ¤ are the suppl ye l asticit yf uncti ons.
I n the presence ofanti - di scrimi nati on pol i cy, ifa ¯rm does choose to prac-
tise discrimi nati on,then there wi l lb es o mep r o b a b i l i t yt h a ta c t i on i s taken or
threatened under the anti- di scrimi nati on l aw . W hether iti nvol ves externall egal
acti on or i s restricted to internalgri evance processes, and w hether successfulor
not,such action w oul d be costly to the ¯rm ,so the expected levelofthisc os ti san
addi tionalel em ent in the¯rm s'costf uncti on. Equalpay pol i cy isas s ume dt ope -
nal i se deviati ons of¸ from 0, and fai r recruitm entand di sm issal poli cies penali se
devi ati onsof¹ from 0.The¯rm i s assum ed to be risk-neutral,so theseuncertai n
penal ties enter the ¯rm ' s expected pro¯t objective as addi tional expected costs.
W e are concerned here onlywi th outcom es invol vi ng a potenti alcase-speci¯ccost
(although the argum ent can be extended to cover the possibi l i t yt h a tj udgem ents
ma ya p p l y to m ore than one em pl oyees). W e are not concerned w ith the sm all
mi nori t y of cases w here tribunal sa r ea bl et oi denti f y and correctdi scrimi nati on
f ul l y by decree. W e now turn to the problem ofm odell i ng thedi scrimi nati on costs
i ntroduced by legislati on.
2. 1.Equalpay pol i cy
An e q ua l - pay acti on agai nst the ¯rm proceeds i n stages: ¯rst the w orker m ust
bri ng hi so rh e rg r i evance to the ¯rm 's attention; at thi ss t a g ei tma yo rma y
notbe resol ved. T he next stage i saf orm alappl i cation to an i ndustri al tribunal
i nvol vi ng a m andatory conci l i ati on phase;thi si nvol vesa new setofl egalcosts for
the ¯rm . F inal l y,the case m ay or m ay not proceed to judgem ent;i f successful ,
the judgem ent w il li mp o s ef urther costs. W e w il lwor k wi th a speci¯cati on that
doesnotdepi ct thisc o mpl ex process ind e t a i l ,butourspeci ¯cati on i sc o ns i stent
wi th the com plex sequentialnature ofthe legalprocess,provi ded theprobabi l i ties
ofacti on and the cost consequences ofthose acti onsare dependenton the actual
degree ofpay di scrimi nati on,¸ practi sed by the¯rm .W ewri te the expected cost
of such acti on as an am ount P (¸) per worker. Si nce every em pl oyee from the
6di sadvantaged group hasthi sa s s oc i ated cost,the addi tion to the ¯rm 's expected
totalcostsproduced by equalpay l egislati on i s:
Costaddi tion = l
¤ [ µ P (¸)] (2.5)
whe r eµ 2 [ 0;1] i s an arti¯ci al vari abl ei ntroduced to represent the severit yo f
equal pay enfo r c e me n t .Th ea s s u mp t i on here i s that the i mp a c to fa l lstages of
the grievance procedure are scal ed up in proportion as enforcem ent severi ty rises
f rom µ = 0 (com plete neglect, equivalent to an absence of legislati o n )t oµ= 1
(ful lenf orcem ent). N ote that the cost addition (2. 5)i s proportionalto l ¤ and thus
equal pay poli cy penali ses the di sadvantaged group i n the sense that i ti mp o s e s
a cost µP (¸) on the em pl oym ent ofan addi tionalworker from the disadvantaged
group,w i th no anal ogouscostfor the advantaged group. T he anti- di scrimi natory
i ntenti on of the pol i cy stem s from the fa c tt h a tP( ¸ )i ncreases wi th the degree
of pay di scrimi nati on. N ote that, i np r a c t i ce, equal pay legislati on treats the
advantaged and di sadvantaged groups sym m etricall y, so that cases m ay also be
broughtby m em bers ofthe advantaged group. H owever,such cases are rel ati vel y
rare, and to simp l i f y the anal ysi s( a tnoe s s e nt i alcost i nt e r mso f g e n e r a l i ty), w e
assum e that there is a zero probabi l i t yo f a c t i ons bei ng i ni tiated by m em bers of
the advantaged group.
2. 2.Fai rr e c r u i tm ent p oli cy
A ssum e that the ¯rm has a random process of labour turnover, at a uni f orm
expected rate of¿ separationsperjob peryear.W epostponeto secti on 3 consi d-
eration ofthe possi bl ymo r er e a l i sticc a s ewhe r edi scrimi nati on hasa di stortionary
e®ect on turnover rates. E very timeav a c a n c yi s¯ l l ed by a m em ber of the ad-
vantaged group,there i s som e probabi l i t yt h a tap r o t e s to rl egal action w i l lbe
l odged. W e assum e that the strength of such cases (and thus the costs of these
acti ons)i sr e l ated to the coe± cient ofem ploym entdiscrimi nati on,¹,f or the ¯rm .
Thus the totaladdi tional expected costs stem m ing f rom fai rr e c r u i tm ent poli cy
are:
Costaddi tion = expected no. ofvacanci es ¯ll ed
£ proportion ¯l l ed from advantaged group
£e x p e c t e dc o s to fa c t i on per vacancy
7=¿ ( l + l
¤)£
l
l+ l ¤ £C r(¹ )
whe r eCr(¹ ) is the expected cost per relevant vacancy. If w e de¯ne the functi on
R( ¹)= ¿ Cr(¹ ) and introduce a factor Á representing theseveri t yo f e n f orcem ent,
the resulting costaddi tion i s:
Costaddi tion = l[ Á R (¹ )] (2.6)
Fai rr e c r u i tm ent poli cy di®ers f rom equal pay pol i cy, since the addi tional cost
elem ent tends to penali se em ploym ent from the advantaged rather than di sad-
vantaged group.
2. 3.Fai rd i sm issal p oli cy
A ssum e that w orkers have to be dism issed random l y( o nd i scipl i nary or redun-
dancy grounds,say)at a uni f orm average rate ¾ , but that com plai nts f or unf ai r
di sm issalon grounds of di scrimi nati on are onl yma d eb yme mb e r so f t h ed i sad-
vantaged group. A gai n, the strength of such com plai nts and the consequent cost
i s assum ed to depend on the degree ofapparent em pl oym ent discrimi nati on,¹,
practi sed by the ¯rm .Thus:
Costaddi tion = expected no. ofdism issals
£ proportion ofdi sm issalsf rom disadvantaged group
£e x p e c t e dc o s to fa c t i on per di sm issal
=¾ ( l + l
¤)£
l ¤
l+ l ¤ £C d(¹ )
whe r eCd(¹ ) is the expected cost per relevant dism issal.Now de¯ne the f uncti on
D( ¹ )= ¾ C d(¹ ) and introduce a factor Ã representing the severit yo f e n f orcem ent.
Ther e s ul ting costaddi tion i s:
Co s ta ddi tion = l
¤ [ Ã D (¹ )] (2.7)
Li ke equalpay pol i cy, fai rd i sm issal poli cy im poses an addi tionalm argi nalcost
on em pl oym ent from the di sadvantaged group.
82. 4.O pti ma l wa g e - s e t t i ng under anti -d iscrimi nati on pol i cy
P utting theseaddi tionalcosts i nto the pro¯tf uncti on,the (m i sperceived)l evelof
expected pro¯t for the i ndi vi dual¯rm i s:




¤ ¡µ P( ¸ ) ¡ÃD( ¹ ) ] ( 2 . 8)
whi ch ist ob ema x i mi sed w ith respect to w and w ¤,s u bj ect to the identi ties
¸=w= w¤ ¡1a n d¹=l =l ¤ ¡½ .
I ti sevi dentf rom (2.8)thattheaddi tionalcostsi m posed by anti - di scrimi nati on
l egislati on are com pl ex int h e i re®ect.Equalpay and f ai rdi sm issallegislati on i n-
troduce new per capita costs µP + Ã D associated w i th any increasei ne mp l oym ent
f rom the disadvantaged group -tendi ng to reduce dem and f or l abour from that
group and thus reduce w ¤ and w orsen the pay di ®erenti al . O n the other hand,
these additionalcosts decl i neasw ¤ and l ¤ are rai sed,thus givi ng an o®setti ng di -
rect incenti ve i nf avourofequalpay. T he posi tion i smodi ¯ed by f ai r recruitm ent
pol i cy, w hich tends to o®set further the decli ne i nd e ma n df or \di sadvantaged"
l abour produced by the i ntroduction ofP and D .
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w¤ µ( 1+ ¸)P
0(¸) = 0 (2.10)
Thes o l uti on ofequati ons(2. 9)and (2. 10)de¯nesthe¯rm ' spr o¯tmaxi mi sing
wage o®ers, e wa n de w¤,to the advantaged and di sadvantaged groups respectivel y.
Wen o wc o n s i derhow the opti ma l d e g r e eo f p a ya n de mp l oym ent discrimi nati on,
e ¸= e w=e w¤¡1a n de ¹=s ( e w) = s ¤(e w¤)¡ ½,respond t o i ncreasi ng degrees ofseveri t y
ofthe three typesofpol i cy,starting f rom an ini tialposi tion ofno pol i cy (µ = Á =
Ã=0 ) .
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whe r e¢ = e ¦w ¤w ¤e ¦ww ¡ e ¦2
w ¤w i s a strictlyp o s i tive determ inant,and subscri pted
term s li ke e ¦ww are cross derivatives ofthe pro¯t f uncti on. T he term s e s, e s ¤,e s 0
and e s ¤0 are the val uesofthe suppl yf uncti ons and thei rde r i vatives,eval uated at
the optimu m.S i mi l ar expressions to (2. 11) and (2. 12) appl yt of ai r recruitm ent
and di sm issal poli cy. N ote that, ing e n e r a l ,i ti s possibl ef or e ¸a n de ¹t ov a r yi n
opposi te directions,i ft het wo groupshavevery di ®erentl aboursuppl y responses.
To exam i ne the e®ects ofi ntroducing anti - di scrimi nati on pol i cy, w e need to
evaluatede ¸=dµ and de ¹=dµatt hepoi n tµ= Á= Ã = 0 .Di ®erenti ati on establi shes
the fol l ow ing resul ts:
e ¦ ww =e s
0 0[ q¡ c¡ e w] ¡ 2 e s
0 <0 ( 2 . 13)
e ¦ww¤ =0 ( 2 . 14)
e ¦w ¤w ¤ =e s
¤0 0[ q
¤ ¡c ¡e w
¤]¡ 2e s
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0( e ¸)(1+ ¸) (2. 17)
e ¦wÁ =¡e s
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0(e ¹) > 0 ( 2. 19)
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0D
0(e ¹) < 0 ( 2. 20)
e ¦ w ¤Ã =e s
¤0 [ (e ¹+½ ) D
0(e ¹ ) ¡ D (¹ )] (2.21)
Taki ng the si gns ofthe cross-deri vatives (2. 13)-(2.21) i nc o n j uncti on w i th the
com parative statics derivatives(2. 11)-(2.12)forµ,Á and Ã,we have the fol l ow ing
results:
Fai rr e c r ui t me n tp o l i cy: de ¸=dÁ and de ¹=dÁ arenegati ve;i n other w ords,the
degrees of both pay and em ploym ent discrimi nati on are unam bi guousl yr e d u c e d
by the (m arginal )i ntroduction offai rr e c r ui tm ent poli cy.
Equalpay and fai rd i sm issalpoli cy: de ¸=dµ,de ¹=dµ,de ¸=dÃ and de ¹=dÃ can-
notbe unam bi guousl ys i gned,so the i ntroduction ofequalpay and fai rdi sm issal
pol i cies m ay either reduce or increasepay and em pl oym ent di®erenti al s. T he rea-
son for the am bi gui t y of these e®ects ist h a te ¦ w ¤µ and e ¦w ¤Ã cannot be si gned.
Co ns i der the l atter. T here are tw o counteracting term s: e s ¤0(e ¹+½ ) D0(e ¹) i sa
posi tive di ®erenti al e®ect stem m ing f rom the fact that the di sm issal cost D (¹ )
i ncreases wi th the degree of discrimi nati on;the second term i s¡e s ¤0D( ¹ )wh i ch
i sane g a t i ve l evele®ect stem m ing f rom the factthatthe m argi naldi sadvantaged
em ployee brings an extra cost ofD (¹ ). T he relati ve si zes ofthe leveland gradient
ofD (¹) (and si mi l arl y of P (¸)) determ ine swhi ch ofthese counteracting term s is
dom i nant. Thi si sa ni ssue invol vi ng the detai l ed design and i mp l em entation of
l egalprocessesand penal ties.
The s ea r ea l so im portant imp l i cations for the pol i cy m ix. Equalpay and f ai r
di sm issal poli cies are relativel ye a s yt oi mp l em ent,since they a®ectworkerswho
are al ready em ployeesofthe ¯rm ,and theref o r eh a v eg o o da c c e s st ot h ek i nd of
i nf orm ati on requi red to supporta com pl ai nt ofdi scrimi nati on. The drawback i s
theirpo s s i bl ei ne®ectiveness or even perverse e®ects. In contrast, actions under
f ai rr e c r ui tm ent poli cy are clearlya n t i - di scrimi natory,buti np r a c t i ce they require
11i ndi vi dual swhohavenotbeen hi red by the¯rm tom akeacom pl ai nt.A soutsi ders,
such indi vi dual s are generall yi n a m uch weaker posi tion to produce evi dence to
supportthei rc o mpl ai nts.
2. 5.A num eri calexam ple
W e have dem onstrated that, even int h i ss i mp l emo d e l ,no una mbi guous resul t
on the i m pact ofequalpay and fai rd i sm issal poli cy is avail abl e. To show that
thisa mbi gui t yi s m ore than a theoreticalcuriosi t y,w e il l ustrate the resultwi th a
simu l ati on based on a particular speci¯cati on ofthesuppl ya n dc o s tr e l ati onshi ps.
P aram eter valuesare i ntended to be pl ausi bl e,but are essential l ya r b i trary. T he
resultshave notbeen f ound to be very sensi tive to anythi ng butthe speci ¯cati on
ofP (: ), R (:)a ndD( : ).
Thel evelof indi vi dualproducti vi t y, q,is set at 1,and the percei ved produc-
tivi t yd i ®erenti al ,( q¡ q ¤)=q; is 10% . N on-l abour uni tc o s ti sc= 0 : 1. Labour
suppl i es are:






and the popul ati on dem ographi cr a t i oi s½= 8( a ppr o x i ma t e l y equal to the ratio
s=s¤ i na ne q u i l i bri um where pay equal i t yi si m posed exogenousl y). W e use two
variants ofthe m odel ,based on al ternative form s for the functi ons P ,R and D .
Eac h oft he s ei s speci¯ed as a probi tf or the probabi l i ty of anti - di scrimi nati on
acti on,m ul tipl i ed by a speci¯ed f orm forthe expected costto the ¯rm peracti on.
Wema k et woal ternative functi onalform assum pti ons,di ®eri ng i nt e r mso f t h e
responsiveness of the costs to the coe± cients ofdiscrimi nati on ¸ and ¹.
(i)Fl at costs
P( ¸)= 1 : 2©( ¯0 +¯ 1¸) (2. 24)
R( ¹)= 1 : 2©( ¯0 +¯ 1¹) ( 2. 25)
D( ¹ )= 0 : 2©( ¯0 +¯ 1¹) ( 2. 26)
(ii )S t eep costs
P( ¸)= 5[ ¸]©(¯0 +¯ 1¸) (2. 27)
R( ¹)= 5[ ¹]©( ¯0 +¯ 1¹) ( 2. 28)
12D( ¹ )= 0 : 5[ ¹]©( ¯0 +¯ 1¹) ( 2. 29)
whe r e¯ 0 =¡ 2 a n d ¯ 1 =0 : 5;© (: )i s the standard norm al distributi on functi on
and [ x]denotesm axfx;0g.
Thes i mu l ation i nvol ves num eri caloptimi sations over a gri do f v a l uesf or µ,Á
or Ã,to m axi mi se the pro¯t functi on. T hi si s done separatel yf or each i nt u r n ,
wi th the other tw o enforcem ent param eters set to zero. T he shapes of the °at
and steep expected cost curves are show n in ¯gure 1,w hi ch plots P (¸). T he ¸;µ
l ocus resul ting f rom the simu l ati on i sp l otted i n ¯gure 2, and the ¸;Á l ocus i n
¯gure 3. Pl ots for ¹ rather than ¸ are qual i tativel ys i mi l ar,and pl ots for Ã are
simi l ar to those for µ; they are not presented here. F lat and steep costs cl early
gi ve ri se to quali tativel yd i ®erent e®ects of poli cy on actual di scrimi nati on. If
the costs to the ¯rm of deali ng wi th discrimi nati on com pl ai nts are steepl yr i sing
wi th the degree of discrimi nati on, then equalpay and fai rd i sm issal poli cy w il l
tend to dimi ni sh the practice of discrimi nati on. O n the other hand,i f costs are
signi ¯cant even at l ow levelso fd i scrimi nati on and rel ati vel yi nsensi tive to the
ma g n i tude ofdi scrimi nati on,such pol i cy m ay be largel yi ne®ecti ve,or even have
the perverse e®ect of increasi ng pay and recrui tm ent di®erenti al s. O n the other
hand f ai rr e c r ui tm ent poli cy isunam bi guousi ni tstendency to reducetheopti ma l
degree ofdi scrimi nati on.
N ote that simu l ati ons (not reported here) inw h i ch µ, Á and Ã are restricted
to beequal(so thatal lthreetypesofpol i cy are used togetherand enforced to the
sam e degree) also display divergent e®ects ofenforcem enton pay and em pl oym ent
di scrimi nati on betw een the cases of°at and steep costs.
3.External i ty an d tu rn over e® ects
It isqui te reasonablet oe x pe c tdi scrimi nati on to have som e i mp a c to nq u i tr at e s .
A w orker w ho perceives hi ms e l f or herselfto be unf ai rly treated m ay quitr a t he r
than stay on and ¯ght a di scrimi nati on case - i n other w ords use the \exit"
rather than \voice" route (Freem an 1980). W e have taken accountofthi st os ome
degree al ready, since the l abour suppl yf uncti on s¤(w ¤) re°ects the e®ect of the
l ow er w age o®ered to m em bers of the disadvantaged group. H ow ever, there m ay
be t wo f urther e®ects. O ne isa ne x t e r n a l i t yi nl abour suppl y, w ith the suppl y
of l abour to the ¯rm from the di sadvantaged group bei ng reduced as a di rect
consequence ofdi scrimi nati on: thus l ¤ =s ¤(w ¤;¹;¸), w here s¤ i si ncreasi ng i n
w¤ butdecreasi ng i n¹a n d¸ .A s e c o n dp o s s i bl ee ® e c ti s on turnover rates. A n
13em ployer m ay be ablet os u s t a i n a steady-state average num ber ofem pl oyees at
l ¤ =s ¤(w ¤;¹;¸)by o®eringawagew ¤ to m em bers ofthe disadvantaged group,but
thismi ghtal so be associated w i th a higher rate of turnover than forw orkersfrom
theadvantaged group.Theassum pti on here i st hati fw orkers perceive them sel ves
to be discrimi nated agai nst, they m ay consequently have a w eaker attachm ent to
the ¯rm and thus have a low er expected job tenure. T hisi nt u r nr a i ses the average
l evelofhiring and traini ng costs form em bersofthe di sadvantaged group.
As s umea sbe f ore that there i sa uni f orm turnover rate ¿ (equalto the reci p-
rocal of expected job tenure) for workers from the advantaged group. W orkers
f rom the disadvantaged group have a turnoverrate of¿+ ±(¹;¸),w here ± i ss ome
i ncreasi ng f uncti on ofthe twoi ndi ces of discrimi nati on,sati sfyi ng the condi tion
±(0;0)= 0. Let the hiring/traini ng costs per head be h and rede¯ne the cost c to
i ncl ude basel i ne turnover cost h¿. T hen expected pro¯t is:





¤ ¡µ P ( ¸ ) ¡ÃD( ¹ ) ¡h ± ( ¹ ; ¸ ) ] ( 3 . 1)
T here are three new e®ects here: (i)l aboursuppl yf rom thedi sadvantaged group
i sdecreased,tendi ng to push up thewageand reducethedegreeofdi scrimi nati on;
(ii )t he r ei san addi tionalturnovercostel em entassociated w i th the em ploym entof
a m em berofthedi sadvanatged group,thustendi ng to reducel abourdem and and
i ncrease the degree ofdi scrimi nati on;(i i i )t h i sa d d i tional turnover cost decli nes
as the degree of discrimi nati on i s reduced, thus givi ng an addi tional i ncenti ve
to reduce the degree of discrimi nati on. T here are agai n o®setting f actors to be
considered, and the e®ect of di ®erent i al turnover m ay be either to reduce or
i ncrease the opti ma ld e g r e eo fd i scrimi nati on,dependi ng on the steepness of the
l abour suppl y and di ®erenti al turnover functi ons s¤(:;¹;¸) and ±(¹;¸).
Thee xt e ns i on ofthe com parati ve statics anal ysi so fs e c t i on 2. 4t ot h i sc a s ei s
straightforw ard butvery tedious. R ather than repeat the analysi s here,w e instead
i l l ustrate the robustness of our earli er conclusi ons by extendi ng the num eri cal
exam plet oi ncl ude externali t y and turnover e®ects. T he m odel used here is
i denti calto (2.22)-(2.29)except for the l aboursuppl y and turnover cost functi ons











h±( ¹;¸)= 0: 01(¹ + ¸) (3. 3)
14Ther e s ul ts for equal pay pol i cy isp l otted i n¯ g u r e4 .A l though the exter-
nal i ties in suppl ya n dd i ®erenti al turnover costs have the e®ect of reducing the
simu l ated degreeofdi scrimi nati on (from 20.5% to 10. 2% i n theabsenceofenf orce-
m ent),there rem ainsa sharp qual i tative di ®erencebet w een the \°at" and \steep"
cost speci¯cati ons,i nt e r mso f t h ei mp l i ed relati onshi pb e t we e n t heopt i ma ld e -
gree ofpay di scrimi nati on and the severi t yo f p o l i cy enfo r c e me n t .I tr e ma i nsat
l east theoreticall yp o s s i bl ef orequalpay and f ai rdi sm issalpoli cy to have perverse
e®ects.
4.C oncl usi on and i mp l i cations f or pol i cy design
Ou rma i nc o n c l usi on i s that the i m pact of equal pay and faird i sm issal poli cy
on the opti mu m d e g r e eo fd i scrimi nati on for an em pl oyer depends criticall yo n
the w ay the legal system w orks. If the costs to the ¯rm of deali ng wi th dis-
crimi nati on com pl ai nts ri se steeplywi th the degree of discrimi nati on,then equal
pay and f ai rd i sm issal poli cy w il ltend to reduce the extent of di scrimi nati on.
O n the other hand,i fc o s t sa r es i gni ¯cant even at l ow levelso fd i scrimi nati on
and rel ati vel yi nsensi tive to the m agni tude of discrimi nati on,such pol i cy m ay be
l argel yi ne®ecti ve,or even have the perverse e®ect of increasi ng pay and recrui t-
me n td i ®er enti al s. T his \°at cost" case isar e a lpo s s i bi l i t y. InB r i taino v e rt h e
peri od 1976-95, onl y7 . 5% of di scrimi nati on cases brought before i ndustri al tri-
bunal sr e s ul ted inaj udgem ent inf avourofthe com plai nantand,even al l ow ing f or
out-of- court settlem ents and errors in tribunaldeci sions,thi s suggests that even
non- di scrimi natory em pl oyers run som e risk of costlya n t i - di scrimi nati on acti on
bei ng taken agai nstthem .Thetheoreti calpossibi l i t yo f n o n - e®ectivenessofequal
pay and f ai rd i sm issal poli cy isa l so consistent w ith the ¯ndi ngs ofm uch ofthe
em pirical li terature, at least fo rt h es e c o n dp h a s eo fp o l i cy fol l ow ing the i ni tial
l egislati ve i m pact. In term s of poli cy design,there i s strong support in our results
f or the use ofa general l y cheap and perm i ssive l egal system w hich nevertheless
ha st hepo we rt oa wa r dhi gh l evels ofcom pensati on i n cases of extrem e discrim-
i nati on. T hus,i n t heUK,t her em ovaloft he$11, 000 com pensation l i mi twhi ch
wasi m posed on i ndustri altribunal spr i orto 1995 seem sa sensi bl er e f orm ,provi de
tribunal sr e s o r tt ohi gh com pensatory awards onl yi n the m ost serious cases.
Ou rs e c o n d ¯ n d i ng i s the unam bi guous nature of the e®ect of fai rr e c r u i t-
me n tp o l i cy.Publ i cs uppo r ta nda s s i stance forcom pl ainantson groundsofunf ai r
recruitm ent is unam bi guousl ya n t i - di scrimi natory, although di ±c u l t to m ake ef-
15f ective. Iti st e mpt i ng to go f urther than this, and clai m supportf rom our results
f or a± rm ati ve acti o nb a s e do ne mp l oym ent quotas. By pushi ng the em pl oyer
tow ards the target em ploym ent ratio,such pol i cy w ouldc l earlyd e c r e a s ep a yd i f -
f erential si n ourm odel-a resul tt ha ti sc o ns i stent w ith em piricalevidence on the
em ploym ent e®ects of U S a± rm ative acti on (Leonard 1984,1989). H owever,the
probl em s of imp l em entation are seri ous. C rude a± rm ati ve acti on cannot easil y
handl ed i ®erences inq u a l i ¯cati ons and abi l i ties. A ± rm ative acti on i nt h ef orm
ofem pl oym ent quotas woul do n l yc o i nci de wi th the idea off ai rr e c r ui tm ent pol-
i cy that isu s e dh e r ei f the quotas correspond to the rel evant popul ati on ratio
½. H ow ever, thisr a t i o shoul db ed e ¯ n e da st h er a t i o oft henumbe r sofpot e nt i al
wor ke r si n thetwo popul ati onshavingt he sam e set of producti vit y characteristi cs.
In practice,a± rm ati ve acti on m ay fal lf ar short ofthi si deal .
O ur¯nalconcl usi on rel atesto the conductofem pi ricalwork.W e have dem on-
strated that anti- di scrimi nati on l egislati on i sn o tas i ngl e hom ogeneous pol i cy.
T here are three separate strands of poli cy relati ng to hi ring,¯ri ng and pay,and
these m ay have quite di®erente®ects.Convi nci ng em pi ricalw ork therefore needs
to identi f ypo l i cy imp a c t si n corresponding detai l .I ti sdi ±c u l ttoseehow thi scan
be done wi thout goi ng beyond the usualwage and em pl oym ent data,and l ook-
i ng atstati sticalevidence on i ndi vi dual¯rm s'experi ence ofinternaland external
gri evance processes related to com pl ai ntsofdi scrimi nati on.
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